Ethical Decision Making Behind the Wheel – A Driving Simulator Study by Samuel, Siby et al.
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology 
2020 




Old Dominion University, syaho001@odu.edu 
Yusuke Yamani 
Old Dominion University, yyamani@odu.edu 
Krishna Valluru 
Donald L. Fisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/psychology_fac_pubs 
 Part of the Applied Ethics Commons, Community Psychology Commons, and the Navigation, 
Guidance, Control, and Dynamics Commons 
Original Publication Citation 
Samuel, S., Yahoodik, S., Yamani, Y., Valluru, K., & Fisher, D. (2020). Ethical decision making behind the 
wheel – A driving simulator study. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 5, 1-7, Article 
100147. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2020.100147 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at ODU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
Ethical decision making behind the wheel – A driving simulator study
Siby Samuel a, Sarah Yahoodik b, Yusuke Yamani b,⁎, Krishna Valluru c, Donald L. Fisher d
a Department of Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo N2L 3G1, Ontario, Canada
b Department of Psychology, Old Dominion University, 250 Mills Godwin Life Sciences Building, Norfolk, VA 23529, United States of America
c Department of Mechanical & Industrial Engineering, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 160 Governors Drive, Amherst, MA 01003, United States of America
d Volpe National Transportation Center, 55 Broadway, Cambridge, MA 02142, United States of America
A B S T R A C TA R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 19 February 2020
Received in revised form 23 May 2020
Accepted 1 June 2020
Available online 11 June 2020
Over the past several years, there has been considerable debate surrounding ethical decision making in situations
resulting in inevitable casualties. Given enough time and all other things being equal, studies show that drivers will
typically decide to strike the fewest number of pedestrians in scenarioswhere there is a choice between striking several
versus one or no pedestrians. However, it is unclearwhether drivers behave similarly under situations of time pressure.
In our experiment in a driving simulator, 32 drivers were given up to 2 s to decide which group of pedestrians to avoid
among groups of larger (5) or smaller (≤1) number of pedestrians. Our findings suggest that while people frequently
choose utilitarian decisions in the typical, abstractmanifestations of the Trolley Problems, drivers can fail to make util-
itarian decisions in simulated driving environments under a restricted period of time representative of the time they
would have to make the same decision in the real world (2 s). Analysis of eye movement data shows that drivers
are less likely to glance at left and right sides of crosswalks under situations of time duress. Our results raise critical
engineering and ethical questions. From a cognitive engineering standpoint, we need to know how long at minimum
a driver needs tomake simple, moral decisions in different scenarios. From an ethical standpoint, wemay need to eval-
uatewhether automated vehicle algorithms can aid decisionmaking on our behalf when there is not enough time for a
driver to make a moral decision.










Ethical decision-making problems have beenwidely studied in different
domains such as healthcare, economics and driving (Awad et al., 2018;
Frison et al., 2016; Kälvemark et al., 2004; Dickinson and Masclet, 2019).
In driving, humans are destined to face infrequent yet safety-critical situa-
tions where casualties are inevitable (Goodall, 2014). These scenarios
could require us to make ethical decisions in a limited amount of time.
For example, with insufficient time to brake, drivers may have to choose
to save five pedestrians crossing the road by veering to the side and instead
striking only one pedestrian, a response that might be infeasible for the
driver as the available time to action (swerve left or right) reduces. The pri-
mary question then surrounds the minimum time required by a driver to
make a moral decision in a safety-critical scenario.
The Trolley Problem is a popular paradigm for studying moral decision-
making processes (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976). In the switch Trolley Prob-
lem, the most common manifestation of the Trolley Problem, participants
are asked to decide whether to flip a switch to change the path of a trolley
that is heading towards five people to a separate track where one person is
standing. Typically, when faced with this moral dilemma, themajority of peo-
ple behave in a utilitarian manner by choosing to sacrifice one individual to
save a group of people. Survey studies consistently show that humans prefer
making utilitarian decisions in Trolley Problem scenarios (Bleske-Rechek
et al., 2010). Recently, the Trolley Problem was studied in a dynamic,
virtual-reality environment (Navarrete et al., 2012). Navarrete et al. (2012) re-
ported that 89%of participants across conditions chose the utilitarian outcome
which was to pull the switch and kill one individual rather than do nothing
and kill five individuals. Several studies demonstrate that participants' subjec-
tive and psychological responses in virtual reality environments closely map
their experience and behaviors in real world settings (Slater et al., 2006).
While utilitarianism is a popular model for how humansmake decisions in
safety-critical scenarios (Bonnefon et al., 2016), until recently the empirical ev-
idence that most humans are utilitarian was largely limited to the realm of
thought experiments. It remained unclearwhether humanswould consistently
choose the utilitarian decision if actually placed in a situation which required
them to take an action consistent with what they said they would do. Recent
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studies have provided a partial answer to this question. For example, in one
study, a virtual environment was used to assess whether participants would
choose to hit one pedestrian in the road over multiple pedestrians
(Faulhaber et al., 2019). Overwhelmingly, participants opted to make a utili-
tarian decision. A similar study, examining the effects of time pressure and nat-
uralism of the method (VR or text based) used to assess moral decision
making, found that time pressure, but not necessarily realism, led to fewer de-
cisions favoring saving the lives of young avatars and female avatars, contrary
to what was seen without time constraints (Sütfeld et al., 2019). Yet, another
study examining the interplay between intuitive and cognitive processes re-
lated to moral judgments found context-dependent gaze durations during de-
cisions that involved sacrifice, leading participants to look for prolonged
durations at their victim, particularly if they had to choose between avatars
from differing genders (Skulmowski et al., 2014).
The second of the above three experiments suggests that as the time avail-
able tomake a decision decreases, the individual diverges fromwhat his or her
decision might be when there is more than enough time to make the decision
(Sütfeld et al., 2019). In this regard, it is worth noting that in the first of the
above three experiments where the participants had 4 s to respond, making
a choice in that period of time is consistent with the choice they would
make without time constraints. Thus, one could confidently hand decision-
making responsibilities over to the driver in such situations. But, critically,
there will come a point when the driver will not have enough time to react,
let alone decide. From a cognitive engineering standpoint, we need to know
when the time is too short for a driver to make a decision consistent with
the decision he or she would make over a longer period of time.
With this in mind, a study was undertaken of the decisions that drivers
would make in a scenario which mimics the Trolley Problem under time
constraints which are more typical of those that might occur in real traffic.
We chose 2 s as the time delimited period because it is typical of the length
of timedrivers have tomake a life or death decision going at freeway speeds
in heavy traffic (Mordipour, 2014). Additionally, we chose to introduce eye
movement data to moral cognition research due to its finer temporal reso-
lution. Please note that gaze behavior in relation to sacrificing decisions
in a trolley dilemma context has already been investigated in pen and
paper studies that show people typically avoid looking at pictures of the
sacrificed individuals (Kastner, 2010). While gaze behavior has been ex-
plored in one previous VR study (Skulmowski et al., 2014), the said study
focused on the temporal duration of the gaze while our study focuses on
the salient accuracy of the fixation.
Specifically, the current driving simulator study examined whether
drivers make utilitarian decisions in situations of unavoidable harm as fre-
quently as previously reported when in control of the vehicle and forced to
make a choice in an interval of just 2 s between strikingfive pedestrians ver-
sus one pedestrian (Scenario 1) or no pedestrians (Scenario 2).
2. Methods
2.1. Participants & design
Thirty-two paid participants (14 females; mean age = 29.2 years, SD =
12.6 years; mean years since licensure = 10.5 years, SD = 11.2 years) were
recruited from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and surrounding
areas. Sixteen participantswere assigned to Scenario 1 and sixteen participants
were assigned to Scenario 2. Following a between-subject design, drivers were
randomly allocated to one of two scenarios. All participants reported good
health, had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and held a valid US
driver's license. Participantswere of varying education levels and includeduni-
versity students, local town workers, university staff and rural entrepreneurs.
2.2. Apparatus
2.2.1. Driving simulator
A high-fidelity driving simulator (Real-Time Technologies Inc., Ann
Arbor,MI) consisting of a full-body 2013model Ford Fusion Sedan,five for-
ward facing projection screens and a single rear-end projection screen, and
a surround speaker system was used in this study. The virtual environment
was projected to the forward screens with a resolution of 1920 × 1200
pixels and to the rear screen with a resolution of 1400 × 1050 pixels
with display refresh rate of 60 Hz. The simulator provided approximately
330° of a field of view.
2.2.2. Eye tracker
A Mobile Eye XG eye tracker (Applied Science Laboratory, Cambridge,
MA) was used to track and record participants' eye movements. The eye
tracker sampled the position of the eye at 30 Hz with a visual range of
50° horizontally and 40° vertically and simultaneously recorded an image
of the forward roadway at 30 Hz. The superimposed eye and forward road-
way scene data were analyzed using the ASL Eye Map software.
2.3. Driving scenarios
Two separate scenarios were designed for the two experiments. The
0.85-mile long scenarios consisted of two lanes in each direction and in-
volved ambient traffic, buildings, some vegetation, and fog. A crosswalk
was placed 3520 ft from the beginning of each scenario. For both Scenario
1 and 2, there was a horizontal curve obscuring the upcoming crosswalk.
The intensity of fog was controlled so that the participants could see the pe-
destrians only 2 s before the crash. The speed limit was 45mph as is typical
of curved roadsections in Massachusetts. Further, to provide experimental
control, all participants were asked to stay on the rightmost lane (of two
lanes). Participants closely adhered to the speed limit and requested lane
placement. Approximately 16 s prior to the cross-walk scenario, a series
of 5 black screen interruptions were presented for 2 s each with a 1-
second time interval between the black screens. The last black screen was
presented 2 s prior to the point where the drivers can first view the pedes-
trians. The sensors were location-based so that the interruptions occurred at
the same location on the roadway for all participants across both scenarios.
The alternating black screens and forward views of the roadway mimicked
the information a driver would receive who was alternately glancing be-
tween an in-vehicle task and the forward roadway (Samuel and Fisher,
2015).
2.3.1. Scenario 1
In this scenario, there was one pedestrian entering the crosswalk from
the left side and five pedestrians from the right side, equally distant from
the driver (Fig. 1). The pedestrians were timed, and the scenario was pro-
grammed such that loss of either one or five pedestrians was unavoidable.
More specifically, the scenario is designed to be a 2-alternative forced-
Fig. 1. Driving scenario 1.
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choice task. By a combination of design (scripting) and mechanics (brake
coefficient), we have effectively constructed a scenario where drivers
need tomake one of two decisions that both involve some form of swerving
(either left or right). Braking was not an effective option because the posted
speed limit was high enough that any braking action would result in a col-
lision given the small braking distance and resultantly small (in the order of
milliseconds) time to collision window.
In thefirst scenario, the participant is driving in the right lane, on a four-
lane road. After being obscured by fog, a group of five pedestrians appeared
in front of the car in a crosswalk two seconds before the driver would strike
the group unless an evasive action was taken. One pedestrian was ap-
proaching from the left. Fig. 3 presents perspective views of both scenarios.
2.3.2. Scenario 2
In the second scenario (see Fig. 2), the participant is driving in the right
lane, on a four-lane road. After being obscured by fog, a group offive pedes-
trians appeared in front of the car in a crosswalk. Therewere no pedestrians
to the left. All other elements were the same as Scenario 1.
2.4. Procedure
Participants provided explicit written consent to participate in this
study. The experimenter provided a set of general instructions for driving
in virtual environments and a couple of practice drives to familiarize the
participants with the driving simulator. After the practice drives, the
participants were outfitted with an eye tracker which was then calibrated
using a 9-point scene calibration process. Following this, the participant
completed one of the two driving scenarios that they were randomly
assigned to. Their task was to drive each scenario at the speed limit (45
mph), following regular traffic rules in the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts while staying in the right lane. Following the experimental drives,
they were asked to complete a post-study questionnaire that included
basic demographic information, driving history, and subjective ethics ques-
tions (the complete list of subjective ethics questions are included in an ap-
pendix following references). There was a total of 16 items on the post-
study questionnaire that were subjective measures of ethics. These items
were assessed on a five-point Likert rating scale with a rating of 1 implying
strong disagreement and a rating of 5 noting strong agreement. No other in-
structions were given to participants.
2.5. Data analysis
Eyemovements of the driversweremanually codedby two independent
raters to judgewhether each driver glanced at the right or left extremities of
the crosswalk in each 2-second interval between the black screens. If the
two raters disagreed, they discussed such glances and resolved the disagree-
ment. The variable was binary coded such that the presence of right or left
glances is coded as “1” or the absence as “0”. Previous experiments analyz-
ing gaze duration towards sacrificed and non-sacrificed avatars used the en-
tire left and right half of the screen as areas of interest (Skulmowski et al.,
2014). For ethics questionnaire items, each driver gave their rating on the
5-point Likert scale (1: Strongly Disagree – 5: Strongly Agree).
3. Results & discussion
To analyze the data, we conducted one-sample t-tests comparing the ob-
tained data against the reported proportion in Navarrete et al. (2012). In
Scenario 1, only 43% of the participants chose the utilitarian outcome
[with a 95% confidence interval (CI) of 20–69]. This proportion is signifi-
cantly less than the 89%, reported by Navarrete et al. (2012) in which the
drivers had 4 s to make a decision (p< .001). The participants glanced to-
wards the left and right extremities of the crosswalk less frequently when
comparing the two-second safety-critical interval to the control intervals
prior to the critical interval. Eye movement data were entered to a series
of one-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with Inter-
val as a within-subject factor, separately for glances to the left and the
right extremities.
Figs. 4 and 5 show mean number of proportions glancing to the right
and left extremities in Scenario 1 and 2 respectively, with the safety-
critical interval highlighted. In Scenario 1, more drivers glanced to the
right during the 1st interval then progressively less until the end of the sce-
nario [F(4, 60) = 3.46, p = .01] but similar number of drivers glanced to
the left extremity during the simulated drive [F(4, 60) = 1.13, p = .34],
Fig. 2. Driving Scenario 2.
Fig. 3. Left Panel: Scenario designwith one pedestrian on the left and 5 pedestrians on the right; Right Panel: Scenario designwith no pedestrian on the left and 5 pedestrians
on the right.
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showing no measurable difference between the intervals where the pedes-
trians were invisible and the last interval where they were visible in both
scenarios. Finally, we analyzed the participants' subjective ratings to a ques-
tionnaire item regarding ethics in driving: “Vehicles should try to protect as
many pedestrians as possible in a crash or collision scenario.” A Shapiro-
Wilk normality test was conducted for each of the two groups, and both
tests indicated significant violations of the normality assumption. There-
fore, we used a non-parametric alternative of independent-samples t-test,
the independent 2-group Mann–Whitney U test. Participants who steered
left and hit only one pedestrian (M = 4.43) did not significantly differ in
their rating than those who continued straight and hit five pedestrians (M
= 4.0), independent 2-group W = 42, p = .25.
In Scenario 2, despite the option to maneuver past the five pedestrians
altogether, only 62.5% of the drivers successfully evaded the group of
five pedestrians (with a 95% CI of 35 to 83). This proportion was again sig-
nificantly less than that of Navarrete et al. (2012) (p = .002). Their eye
movements to the left and right sides during the 2 s immediately prior to
the crash were no different from those during the control intervals. In Sce-
nario 2, the number of drivers glancing to the left and right extremities did
not vary across the different time intervals [both p > .27]. Similarly to Sce-
nario 1, drivers who opted for the utilitarian outcome (M = 4.38) did not
significantly differ in their rating regarding ethics in driving than those
who did not opt for the utilitarian outcome (M = 4.33), independent 2-
group W = 30, p = 1.
Our findings suggest that while people frequently choose utilitarian de-
cisions in the typical, abstract manifestations of the Trolley Problems,
drivers can fail to make utilitarian decisions in simulated driving environ-
ments representative of the restricted period of time they would have to
make the same decision in the real world (two seconds). This finding by it-
self may not seem surprising, especially given a typical perception-response
time of 1.5 s in driving scenarios (Muttart, 2018). However, this general
perception-response time depends on a number of different factors. For
our particular scenario, studies indicate that 85% of drivers can respond
faster than 1.4 s when a previously obstructed hazard is first seen in the
road and 95% can respond faster than 1.7 s. (Muttart, 2018). In summary,
from an engineering perspective, two seconds seems like it is enough
given the information on perception-response times in the literature
(e.g., Muttart, 2018). But, we have seen with our experiment that 2 s is sim-
ply too little time to make a decision consistent with the choice drivers
would make given a longer time frame.
We simplydonot knowhowmuch time is enough tomake ethical decisions
while driving, but clearly need to know. This time will depend on a number of
factors, some still to be discovered. Froman ethical standpoint, we are now in a
position to know that algorithms used in automated driving systems could
make decisions for us that we cannot make when time is constrained and
that we would prefer given a longer time to make the decisions. This question
has not been raised to date with respect to more complex scenarios like those
we have discussed and we think it deserves more attention.
Interestingly, the eye movement data show that the drivers are less
likely to glance at the left and right sides of the road when under stress
(in the safety-critical interval) than they are when not under stress. To
put this slightly differently, the stress presumably induced when the driver
discovers that he or she is about to strike five pedestrians causes the driver
to become functionally fixated on the outcome, instead of looking for more
alternatives (Orasanu, 1997). We now understand that the mental process
of appraising a threat and the available countermeasures take place in the
pre-frontal cortex (PFC). If the threat can be handled by means of well-
practiced habits, a response is triggered at lower brain levels (the amygdala
and the basal ganglia). When habitual responses are not applicable to the
threat, as is presumably the case in our scenario, reasoning and recall of
non-habitual behaviors are required. Unfortunately, and for reasons not
fully understood, the stress response (which quickly triggers a host of
changes in brain functions) inhibits activity in the PFC (Arnsten, 2009).
These changes in brain function probably have survival value for “fight or
flight” responses but may be maladaptive in the face of many modern
threats such as the one we have in this scenario.
The results of the post-study questionnaire were not found to be statis-
tically significant between the utilitarian and non-utilitarian drivers across
any of the 16 items (see Appendix). The mean score for utilitarian drivers
on item 6 on the questionnaire (‘It is acceptable to risk harming others in
order to save one's own life’) is 1.73 compared to 1.94 for the non-
utilitarian drivers. On a subsequent item (‘It is right to harm one person
on the road to save many people’), utilitarian drivers posted lower mean
score of 2.87 compared to 3.35 for the non-utilitarian. While the results
were not significant between utilitarian and non-utilitarian drivers in
terms of subjective ratings, drivers tended to behave differently when put
in situations of time-constrained ethical decision making. Future studies
should perhaps focus more on the underlying mechanisms that control
drivers behavior instead of solely relying on what they say.
Ultimately, human choices to make utilitarian decisions may rest on
several cross-cultural, socio-economic and physiological factors (Costa
et al., 2014; Terpstra et al., 1993; Vitell et al., 1993). The current study uti-
lizes eye movements to demonstrate how a sample of college town drivers
would respond to safety-critical situations requiring moral judgments
under time pressure of 2 s. Inevitably, there remains much to be learned
about the factors that need to be considered. However, from an implication
perspective, there are a few key takeaways formajor stakeholders including
auto manufacturers, policy officials and the general public. Policy officials
Fig. 4. Proportion of drivers glancing to the right (black) or the left (gray) extremity
as a function of time until crash in seconds. [Note: negative time indicates the
duration before a potential collision].
Fig. 5. Proportion of drivers glancing to the right (black) or the left (gray) extremity
as a function of time until crash in seconds. [Note: negative time indicates the
duration before a potential collision].
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may consider the impacts of time duress on ethical decision making. Now
we have data that tells us that our decisions given ample time do not neces-
sarily alignwith our decisions under limited time.With an understanding of
the delimited time limit of 2 s, traffic engineers could consider integrating
design elements in the traffic infrastructure that minimize the occurrence
of situations requiring a sudden, ethical outcome. Auto manufacturers
may consider these findings in the development of AV moral algorithms
to closely align with expectations. The drivers themselves may utilize
these findings to better calibrate themselves regarding the limits on effec-
tive decision making under situations where outcomes need to be deter-
mined in under 2 s. A better understanding of temporal limits provides us
with more effective pathways towards realizing desirable decision
outcomes.
3.1. Limitations
There are several limitations with our approach. First, the study consists
of only two scenarios. Generalizability across all situations will be limited.
However, we chose to include what we thought was the most representa-
tive scenario to a philosophical thought experiment. Second, no measures
of hazard mitigation involving steering or brake responses were collected
in the current project and ultimately the ability to mitigate a potential
threat is a critical component of what enables crash avoidance. Future re-
search should incorporate drivers' steering and braking responses as behav-
ioral measures that may provide further insights into drivers' intention in
the driving environment involving ethical dilemmas under time con-
straints. Third, the study is conducted on a driving simulator and incorpo-
rates a small sample that may not be fully representative of the general
population thereby placing some limits on generalizability to the open
road. The simulator did offer a safe environment to collect data in a con-
trolled environment. Fourth, previous research indicates that several fac-
tors that were not controlled in this study, such as demographic traits
(including education, employment, and language) and socio-cultural and
environmental characteristics, are likely to affect ethical decision making
in drivers. Further research should explore the specific individual, demo-
graphic, cultural, or societal factors that impact ethical decision making
for drivers both in traditional vehicles and those equipped with more ad-
vanced assistance systems. Last, the inclusion of a condition where drivers
make decisions in a trolley scenario following a period of extended supervi-
sion or monitoring in a mid-level autonomous vehicle, would have allowed
for a robust comparison of drivers' decisionmaking under duress across sys-
tems with different levels of autonomy. This can be a future study.
4. Conclusions
n summary, the essence of the abstract Trolley Problem centers on human
agency. Is an individual willing to let nature take its course and not intervene
or, instead, to intervene and essentially save a number of lives? The answer
from surveys is that most individuals were willing to intervene, to make
what was essentially a utilitarian choice. But there was still the question of
whether people would actually perform this way when given actual agency.
Simulators allow researchers to study this. And indeed, when given enough
time, individuals didmake the utilitarian choice (Navarrete et al., 2012). Nev-
ertheless, individuals are not always given enough time. In fact, our research
suggests that drivers are routinely placed in time constrained situations
where the decisions they make under such constraints are not consistent
with the decisions they would make given more time. As a consequence,
our research directly raises the question of whether algorithms in automated
driving systems that more accurately reflect our choices should perhaps be
allowed to make those choices for us as drivers, especially when we do not
have the time we need to make the choices we presumably would prefer.
Note that this flies directly in the face of a common sentiment. Most drivers
do not want ethical decisions being made for them. What they do not
know, in our opinion, is that they are placing themselves in situations
where the decisions they are making are contrary to the decisions that they
would have made given more time.
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Appendix A. Results of post-study questionnaire
Items
Mean rating (1 = Strongly disagree,








Rules of road are the key in determining whether the action is right or wrong.
(Ex:- Not overtaking school bus, yielding to the drivers in roundabouts, etc.)
4.60 4.59 0.05 0.96
It's fair to take driving allowances too, while driving on freeway.
(Ex: Pulled over by police, observing speed limits, etc.)
3.87 3.41 1.25 0.22
You rely more on personal state of mind while making decisions on road.
(For Ex: Fear, Frustration, Enjoyment, Loneliness, etc.)
2.40 2.29 0.27 0.79
Applying on-road rules too rigidly forces you towards a possible collision. 2.60 2.76 0.40 0.69
I get disconnected on road while driving in traffic with exceedingly congested public. 3.07 2.59 1.33 0.19
It is acceptable to risk harming others in order to save one's own life. 1.73 1.94 0.72 0.48
It is right to harm one person on road to save the lives of many people. 2.87 3.35 1.34 0.19
I feel that I can't trust the people and pedestrians on the road. 3.27 3.29 0.07 0.95
Following the vehicles in front of me when I am lost, but I find it difficult to completely trust them. 3.27 2.65 1.67 0.10
I prefer to do secondary tasks while driving in town. 2.07 2.24 0.48 0.64
Hand-held mobile phone conversation while driving doesn't have you preoccupied. 2.00 2.12 0.31 0.76
Vehicles should try to protect as many pedestrians as possible in a crash or collision scenario. 4.13 4.47 1.30 0.20
Long and forward roadway glances are not so important on a freeway drive. 2.13 1.76 1.06 0.30
(continued on next page)




Mean rating (1 = Strongly disagree,








Emotions of driver play an important role in on-road decision making.
(Ex: Driving Distraction, Road rage, etc.)
4.33 4.00 1.17 0.25
Whether you are calm, nervous, or hot-tempered, your emotions are affected by the
interactive behavior of people on road.
3.80 3.59 0.51 0.61
Use of good judgment, common sense, courtesy, and safe driving rules are insignificant
to ensure your safety and the safety of others.
1.53 1.71 0.44 0.67
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